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NPM, Administrative Reforms and Public Service Motivation: Improving 
the Dialogue between Research Agendas 
Nicola Bellé1 and Edoardo Ongaro2 
Abstract 
This article makes use of the Italian case of administrative reform to investigate the changes 
in the Public Service Motivation (PSM) of public employees and managers after two decades 
of NPM-inspired reforms. It emerges that NPM reforms may be associated with a reduction 
of the stock of PSM; however, important qualifications apply. By providing so far entirely 
unavailable evidence about PSM in both the public and the private/commercial sectors in 
Italy, the article also contributes the empirical bases for the development of comparative 
research on the interrelation between trajectories of administrative reform and changes in the 
drivers of motivation of public servants. 
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Points for practitioners 
Public management reforms may have an effect in terms of accretion or depletion of Public 
Service Motivation (PSM), in its turn likely to be conducive to improved performance of the 
public sector. Policymakers should include in the design and evaluation of public sector 
reforms the potential impacts on the drivers of the motivation of public servants. PSM is also 
a factor that may be profoundly influential on the dynamics of reform processes, to be 
systematically considered by reformers in different jurisdictions.  
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Introduction 
This paper represents an attempt to build a bridge between two areas of research that seem so 
far to have developed in parallel in the field of public management, without any real 
dialogue: the stream of research on the drivers of the motivation of public servants – and we 
here make reference in particular to the Public Service Motivation (PSM) theory (Perry and 
Wise, 1990; Perry and Hondeghem, 2008; Perry, Hondeghem and Wise, 2010) – and the 
research on the ‘trajectories of reform’ in public management and the differentiated responses 
by individual countries to the global pressures of New Public Management (NPM), a stream 
of research typified by the work of Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011).  
One reason why the gap between these two streams of research seems to have been quite 
large may lie in their respective focus: the micro-level of individual public employees in the 
case of PSM as opposed to the macro-level of the public sector as a whole in the case of the 
reform trajectories analysis3. Research methods employed may be another cause: quantitative 
                                                          
3 Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) define public management reform as deliberate attempts to change the 
processes and structures of the public sector to make them, in some sense, run better; Barzelay (2001) refers 
to public management policy change as changes to institutional rules and organisational routines in areas like 
budget, audit and evaluation, organisation and methods. Both definitions refer to public management as 
(change occurring) at the level of ‘institutions’, be they conceived of as rules, or as structures and processes, 
rather than at the level of individuals’ values and traits. This is the focus of the PSM research, which is centred 
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methods – mostly observational (Wright and Grant, 2010) – have been usually preferred by 
scholars in the PSM stream, also given the nature of the research questions addressed; 
qualitative, longitudinal case studies are the main research tool for scholars in the latter 
group.  
Research in public management has much to benefit from bridging these two streams 
(Moynihan, 2010). In this article we make use of the Italian case of administrative reform and 
PSM to address two issues that interrelate the two dimensions. We first ask how the Italian 
case can be characterised in terms of the PSM of its public personnel and managers – 
following one decade of intense NPM reforms (the 1990s) and one decade of more piecemeal 
reforms (the 2000s) that have mixed provisions reversing previous NPM-inspired 
interventions with provisions further emphasising NPM components. We have formulated the 
first research question as follows: What is the motivational profile of Italian public servants? 
In other words, “what is Italy a case of” in terms of the PSM of its public personnel and 
managers? This question, although ultimately descriptive in nature, is relevant for 
comparative studies: by adding a so-far overlooked profile to the social scientific knowledge 
of the Italian public sector, it allows us to characterise it along an important dimension of 
analysis. The survey-based research we conducted (see section ‘Methodology’) aims at filling 
this gap in international public management studies.  
We then investigate what may have been the consequences of NPM reforms on the Italian 
public servants’ PSM: have NPM reforms led to a depletion of PSM? Has the civil service in 
Italy become more akin to the private/commercial sector? In other words, we query whether 
the NPM does have a ‘normalising effect’ on the civil sector, making government ‘business-
like’, at least in terms of public employees’ motives and values. We have elaborated a 
twofold formulation for the second research question: Have NPM reforms in Italy made the 
civil service, in terms of its workers’ motivational profile, akin to the commercial sector? 
And what may be conjectured more generally about the impact of NPM reforms on the 
accretion or depletion of PSM of public servants in a given jurisdiction?  
There are a number of reasons why the Italian case may be useful for addressing the 
theoretical research question about the impact of NPM – and specifically its alleged 
normalising effect – on the motivational structure of the civil service. An interesting feature 
of the Italian case is its starting point. Although we do not have any measures of Italian 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
on attitudes of individuals, even when these are studied at the level of aggregates at the country (or other 
jurisdiction) level.  
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public servants’ PSM that date back in time, a range of features that have historically 
characterised the public sector of this country – such as the distinctiveness of the civil service 
from labour regulation in the private sector; the ubiquitous influence of administrative law (a 
separate body of law regulating the public sector only) and the values embodied in it; the 
status acknowledged to public officials; the very conception of the state as a guiding force of 
society, distinct from it (see Borgonovi, 1984; Borgonovi and Ongaro, 2011; Capano, 2003; 
Cassese 1993 and 1999; Gualmini and Capano, 2006; Ongaro, 2008, 2010 and 2012) - all 
seem to operate in the direction of making working for the public sector quite distinctive 
from working in the private sector. Hence, they make it sensible to make the assumption that 
before the successive waves of managerial reforms started at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Mele, 2010; Mele and Ongaro, forthcoming; Ongaro, 2009 and 2011) there was a significant 
difference in the level of PSM between the public and the private sector in Italy. This 
(assumed) starting point is interesting because it allows ‘testing’ the consequences of NPM 
reforms on PSM.  
In Italy, NPM-inspired reforms have been quite intense (successive reforms occurred over 
short time spans), radical in the contents, and wide in scope during the 1990s, whilst less so 
during the 2000s, although the end of the first decade of the third millennium was also 
characterised by interventions that included some NPM measures, like performance-related 
pay provisions based on a forced-distribution rating system (Belle 2010). A qualification of 
the changes that occurred as a consequence of managerial reforms – not all of them 
ascribable to NPM – and a more nuanced picture is developed in a subsequent section. 
Changes have been manifold and sweeping at the level of rhetoric, definitely less radical and 
substantive at the level of authoritative decisions in the form of new regulation of the public 
sector, and much less substantial at the level of the actual effects (Ongaro and Valotti, 2008). 
For the purposes of the argument, suffice here to say that a significant amount of NPM-
inspired change did occur in Italy during the last two decades, allowing for this case to be a 
proper one for ‘testing’ an alleged normalising effect of NPM on PSM.  
A further feature makes the case worth investigating for the purposes of probing into the 
impacts of NPM: reforms have impacted in a differential way across policy sectors: thus, e.g., 
the healthcare sector has undergone a massive NPM treatment, that has left the sector 
marketised, corporatised, managerialised in both the rhetoric and the practice of the systems 
in place for running hospitals and local healthcare units; on the other side, sectors like law 
enforcement or education have indeed seen some NPM-inspired measures, like forms of 
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corporatisation and managerialisation, but to a limited extent, and without a massive recourse 
to other mechanisms, like market-type mechanisms. It is thus possible to ‘control’ for the 
impact of NPM on PSM by measuring PSM on a sector-by-sector basis (under the 
assumption of an initial state of affairs of higher PSM throughout all fields of the public 
sector contrasted with the private/commercial sector, as discussed in the following section).  
 
Framing the argument 
Two assumptions underlie any claim that can be made, on the basis of the empirical 
investigation on PSM in Italy reported in this paper and based on a one-shot large-scale 
survey administered in 2011, about the ‘effects’ of NPM-inspired reforms on the levels of 
PSM. The first assumption is that the initial state of affairs – the public sector before the 
wave of NPM reforms – was characterised by a level of PSM in the public sector higher than 
in the private/commercial sector. This assumption is coherent with the attraction-selection-
attrition framework put forward by Perry and Wise (1990) and supported by empirical 
research suggesting that “public sector workers do show greater PSM” (Steijn 2008, p. 21) 
and tend to value meaningful public service more highly than private sector employees (for a 
review, see Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise, 2010). This is to some extent part and parcel of 
PSM theorisations (see a section below); nonetheless, it should be explicitly acknowledged 
that researchers engaged in the investigation of PSM cannot rely on long-term series about its 
levels over the time: we do not have data dating back in time. The ‘when‘ of PSM theory 
(that, together with the ‘who and the ‘where’, determines what Whetten refers to as ‘the 
temporal and contextual factors [that] set the boundaries of generalizability’s of any theory, 
Whetten, 1989, p.492) still represents an important limitation for studies of PSM, since what 
is available is only surveys all conducted in a relatively recent time span.  
The second assumption is that the level of PSM was broadly the same across the different 
fields within the public sector, and specifically that it was the same or similar in the 
healthcare field - that is, the sector that was swept by a spate of NPM reforms -and in the 
other fields, like law-enforcement or general government, that were less dramatically affected 
by NPM reforms. This is disputable (although we do not see any decisive counter-argument 
about why this assumption should a priori be rejected), and we underline this limitation in the 
discussion of the findings.  
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The two assumptions combined provide the depiction of a public sector before the wave of 
NPM reforms – the ancien régime, paraphrasing Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) discussion of 
continuity and change in public management after the reforms started in the 1980s – which is 
distinctive (i.e., diverse from the private/commercial sector) and relatively uniform in the 
terms of PSM.  
The development of our argument then considers two core doctrinal elements of the NPM, 
namely the transfer of private sector techniques and logics to the public sector (‘business-like 
government’), and public choice models rooted in a utility-maximising interpretation of 
human behaviour (for a critical discussion, see inter alia Christensen and Laegreid, 2007). 
Both sets of doctrines – whilst profoundly diverse in terms of their premises, origins, roots in 
the academia, and substantive claims – share an emphasis on the pre-eminence of self-
regarding behaviours rather than the other-regarding behaviour associated to a higher level of 
PSM. To the extent that the NPM has a transformative influence – rather than just an 
incremental one - over the public sector (Ferlie et al., 1996), it may then be attributed an 
effect in the direction of making the public sector ultimately more akin to a place dominated 
by self-regarding behaviours; in the terms of our theorisation, a place with a level of PSM 
similar to the one that may be detected in the commercial sector (e.g., Steijn, 2008). In other 
words, reforms inspired by NPM doctrines may have a ‘normalising’ effect on the public 
sector, making it more alike the commercial sector (a claim that seems to some extent to have 
been suggested by certain contributions – e.g. Bordogna, 2008; Le Grand, 2003 –, but to our 
knowledge it has never been directly elaborated through the theoretical lens of PSM).  
Having made the underlying rationale explicit (), the next two sections examine the two 
key components of our argument, namely the NPM and NPM-driven reforms in Italy, on one 
hand, and PSM (constructs, concepts and variables), on the other hand. We then turn to 
illustrate methodology and survey results. Findings are then discussed in order to address the 
two research questions, and revisit the argument drafted in this section.  
 
Public management reforms and NPM in Italy 
We will consider different levels in outlining NPM ‘in action’ (Ferlie et al., 1996) in the 
Italian case, ranging from the public sector as a whole to individual policy sectors. It is 
received wisdom that NPM is far from being a coherent set of doctrines about how the public 
sector should be run, and the reader will surely not be stricken by the consideration that not 
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all that has gone on in Italy over the past two decades concerning the re-organisation of the 
public sector has been implementation of NPM, or can be re-conduced to NPM pressures. For 
example, some trends to devolution to regional and local governments may partly be 
attributed to global trends to decentralisation that may perhaps to a certain extent be ascribed 
to NPM doctrines, but for another part they have endogenous causes – the electoral success of 
the previously inexistent Northern League party being one of them.  
A synthetic overview of the public management reform trajectory in Italy between 1992 
and 2010 may be outlined as follows (see Ongaro, 2009, pp. 65-79; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2011, chapter 4 and appendix on Italy; see also Fedele and Ongaro, 2008): 
- Financial management trajectory: from input-oriented spending responsibility to 
limited forms of responsibility budgeting system; patchy diffusion of accrual 
accounting and cost-calculation systems (mainly in the healthcare sector). 
- Audit and performance measurement: ex post controls have been introduced and 
partly replaced ex ante controls; spread of performance indicators, though mostly used 
for monitoring rather than decision-making – the notable exception being the 
healthcare sector; 
- Organisation of the public sector: from homogeneity to differentiation in the 
organisational schemes adopted by public sector organisations; use of divisional, next 
to functional, organisational models for ministries; massive employment of purchaser-
provider split in the healthcare sector; use of Market-Type Mechanisms – MTMs – in 
certain areas of welfare (mainly healthcare); 
- Personnel management: a succession of three reforms has profoundly changed the 
way public personnel is regulated and managed – given the significance of this 
‘component’ of public management reform for PSM, these reforms are illustrated in 
closer detail in the remainder of this section.  
Before delving into personnel management reforms, it is useful to further qualify change in 
relation to the policy sectors. Zooming in on the level of policy sectors, one can be singled 
out for the extent of change that occurred, and the radical NPM character of the reforms that 
were implemented: healthcare. In this sector a process of systematic deployment of MTMs – 
e.g., through the introduction of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and the split of the 
purchasing and providing function of health services – combined with the massive 
corporatisation of hospitals and local healthcare units has taken place (Cantù, 2011). The 
extent to which NPM-inspired reforms were introduced in the healthcare system has no 
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parallel in other areas of the public sector, like government administration, or education, or 
law enforcement (which has remained largely untouched by massive NPM reforms).  
Three successive waves of reform – i.e., the First Privatisation4, the Second Privatisation, 
and the Brunetta Reform – have reshaped the Italian public personnel administration over the 
last two decades (Ongaro and Bellé, 2010; Bordogna and Neri, 2011). The First Privatisation 
took place in 1993, when the ‘technical’ government led by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi adopted a 
comprehensive reform package: Legislative Decree 29/93, which had been initiated and 
promulgated by the previous Amato Government, followed the guidelines set out by 
Delegating Law 421/92, which primarily aimed at reducing government spending in order to 
meet the Maastricht criteria and overcome a serious financial crisis. With the First 
Privatisation, the former sovereign employer model, in which the government unilaterally 
determined staff regulations in the public sector, was replaced by a collective bargaining 
system similar to that in place in the private sector. National collective employment 
agreements came to be negotiated between public employees’ national unions and the 
Agenzia per la Rappresentanza Negoziale del Pubblico Impiego (ARAN), a newly-created 
public agency representing government organisations. Based on the rules set out by national 
collective bargaining agreements, each government organization had to negotiate 
decentralized/integrative collective bargaining agreements with workplace representations 
comprising both workforce representatives elected by their fellow employees and local trade 
union representatives. Among other innovations, the 1993 reform abolished automatic salary 
increases and introduced performance-related pay (PRP) provisions for employees of all 
grades. The First Privatisation affected about eighty percent of public employees and left out 
only a few categories: the most senior state executives, judges, state attorneys, military 
personnel, the police, diplomats, prefects, and university professors. As public employment 
relations shifted from the administrative law to the civil code, jurisdiction over employment 
disputes wandered from administrative to ordinary tribunals.  
The Second Privatisation took place in the late 1990s. In 1998, the centre-left government 
led by Romano Prodi adopted a new civil service reform package to follow through on the 
trajectory set out by the First Privatisation, which had been only partially implemented. The 
                                                          
4 The term “Privatization” does not indicate the privatisation of public services, but specifically refers to the 
contractualisation of employment relations, i.e. the adoption of  a collective bargaining system in place of the 
previous “sovereign model” in which staff regulation in the public sector were unilaterally determined by the 
Government (see for instance Bordogna and Neri 2011), and the shift of the employment relationship from the 
administrative law to the civil code. 
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Second Privatisation, which was devised by then Minister for Public Administration Franco 
Bassanini, extended the contractualisation of employment relations to the some four hundred 
senior state executives who had not been affected by the First Privatisation. The 1998 reform 
significantly decentralized the public collective bargaining system, reducing the scope of 
national agreements in favor of integrative local contracts. The Second Privatization reduced 
controls by the Government and the Court of Auditors on collective bargaining both at the 
national and at the organisation levels, thus leaving more autonomy and leeway to the 
negotiating parties. 
In 2009, the centre-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi adopted a new 
comprehensive reform of the Italian civil service. On the one hand, the Brunetta Reform – so 
dubbed after the Minister for Public Administration who devised it – revamped some of the 
NPM-inspired performance management provisions that had been introduced by the two 
previous reforms without having been fully implemented in practice. On the other hand, it 
regulated by law aspects of public personnel administration that were previously determined 
though collective bargaining agreements (e.g. criteria for within-grade salary steps) or 
autonomously decided by the management at the organization level (e.g. the distribution of 
performance ratings). Table 1 summarizes the impact of the three waves of reform on the 
main features of the Italian public personnel administration.  
[Please see  http://www.unibocconi.it/belle_ongaro_table1 
 
The First Privatisation, the Second Privatisation, and the Brunetta Reform have 
significantly reshaped the role of Italian public managers. The First Privatisation had at its 
core the idea of ‘letting managers manage’ (Ongaro and Bellé, 2010). To pursue this goal, it 
attempted to draw a clearer line between politics and administration. On the one hand, elected 
officials were vested with the responsibility of setting strategic goals, allotting financial 
resources, and assessing results. Public managers, on the other hand, were granted broad 
operational autonomy (e.g., only civil servants were allowed to sign contracts with third 
parties that were legally binding on the organization). With the contractualisation of the 
public employment model, public managers were no longer appointed through administrative 
law acts but upon acceptance of individual private-like hiring proposals. The First 
Privatisation amended the traditional career-based system, introducing the possibility to hire a 
limited percentage of the management staff through fixed-term contracts. Before the First 
Privatisation, tenured public executives used to spend their entire career in the same position, 
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unless they were promoted. Now they could be periodically re-assigned to different positions, 
based on their competencies and previous performance. Each management position had to be 
filled either by a tenured civil servant temporarily assigned to it or by a non-tenured manager 
hired with a fixed-term contract. The First Privatisation granted public managers a greater 
autonomy in administering the personnel directly assigned to them. 
The Second Privatisation had at its core the idea of ‘making managers manage’ (Ongaro 
and Bellé, 2010), by putting emphasis on managerial responsibility, by re-launching PRP 
schemes, and reducing seniority requirements for promotion; public managers were made 
also more accountable through an extensive reform of internal controls that was passed in 
1999. The Second Privatisation increased the percentage of management staff that could be 
hired through fixed-term contracts and extended the contractualisation of the employment 
relations to the most senior public sector executives. On the one hand, the 1998 reform 
formally strengthened public managers’ autonomy beyond financial and human resource 
management to include micro-organization. On the other hand, as argued by scholars in the 
field (e.g., Carinci 2011; Rusciano 2008; Zoppoli 2009), the Second Privatization, de facto, 
strengthened the trade unions’ power in the bargaining process and their influence over 
micro-management issues.  
The Brunetta Reform has had an ambivalent impact on the autonomy of Italian public 
managers. On the one hand, the 2009 reform has restated and extended executives’ autonomy 
in micro-organization matters vis-à-vis politicians and the unions. On the other hand, the 
Brunetta reform has introduced new legal constraints that have significantly reduced 
managerial discretion. For instance, the managers of most public organizations are now 
required by the law to apply a forced distribution of their employees’ performance ratings and 
this provision cannot be overruled by collective agreements. The third reform has also 
introduced a series of harsher punishments for managers who do not exert a diligent oversight 
over their employees. 
 
Public Service Motivation 
Since Perry and Wise (1990, 368) defined public service motivation (PSM) as “an 
individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public 
institutions and organizations,” PSM research has blossomed into a vibrant field of study 
(Perry and Hondeghem, 2008). Over time, scholars have proposed three major variations on 
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the same theme (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise, 2010). Brewer and Selden reframed the 
concept of PSM as “the motivational force that induces individuals to perform meaningful 
[…] public, community, and social service” (1998, 417). Along the same lines, Rainey and 
Steinbauer referred to PSM as a “general, altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a 
community of people, a state, a nation or humankind” (1999, 20). A more recent definition by 
Vandenabeele encompassed “belief, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and 
organisational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity” (2007, 547). 
Since the Perry and Wise (1990) essay, some 150 studies on PSM have been published 
internationally (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise, 2010). Scholarly effort has been primarily 
devoted to two issues: the conceptualization and measurement of the PSM construct and the 
investigation of the relationship between PSM and its antecedents and consequences (e.g., 
Coursey and Pandey, 2007; Kim, 2009b; Kim and Vandenabeele, 2010; Ritz, 2011; 
Vandenabeele, 2008; Wright and Christensen, 2009). Over time, PSM research has also 
spread from the United States to many countries in Europe, Asia, and Australiasia allowing 
testing of theoretical predictions in a broad range of populations.  
 
Methods 
Our sampling frame covered the entire population of Italian workers. We used a multi-stage 
stratified cluster sampling design. At the first stage of sampling, we randomly selected twenty 
out of the one-hundred and ten provinces that constitute the Italian State. We used probability 
proportional to size sampling to choose these twenty primary sampling units, with the 
probability of selection into the survey sample for each province being proportional to its 
relative population as of 2010. In each province, we sampled a number of organizations and 
individual businesses (i.e. the elementary units) that was proportional to the province 
population. In doing this, we stratified by sector (i.e. private, public, and non-profit) using 
proportionate allocation, which required a sampling fraction in each of the strata that was 
proportional to that of the 2010 population of Italian workers as reported by the Italian 
National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT). Our final selection consisted of about 4,500 
individuals. Sixteen research assistants personally contacted all of the workers in the sample 
– multiple times, when needed – and invited them to answer a short questionnaire that took 
between two and five minutes to complete. To maximize the response rate, the survey was 
administered both online and in paper format at the workplace. Of the around 3,200 workers 
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who had accepted our invitation to take the survey, 2,654 individuals answered all the 
questions. 
 
Please see http://www.unibocconi.it/belle_ongaro_table2 
  
Measures 
Public Service Motivation 
In the design of the survey, we proceeded as follows. First, absent strong evidence of the 
external validity of any of the revised versions of the PSM scale proposed by Perry (1996), 
we included all of Perry’s 24 original items in the survey. All items used 5-point Likert-type 
scales with anchors of 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). We applied confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) to test whether the four-correlated-factor model proposed by Perry 
(1996) was a good fit to our survey data. Both inferential χ2 statistics and descriptive 
goodness-of-fit indices (GFIs) suggested that the Perry’s 24-item scale was a poor fit to our 
data. The χ2 (a lower χ2 indicates a better fit) turned out to be large enough to reject the 
hypothesis that the 24-item model reproduced sample covariance (χ2(df=246)=736.9; 
p<.001).  Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) also disconfirmed the 24-item model. RMSEA values 
close to .08 or below and CFI and TLI values close to .90 or above suggest a reasonably good 
fit (Byrne, 2001; Kline, 2005; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000). The RMSEA was too large 
(.13) and the two fit indexes were too small (CFI=.74; TLI=.72). Given the disconfirmation 
of the 24-item model, we estimated an alternative model. Drawing on Kim (2009b), we 
removed the items with the lowest factor loadings in each subscale, and CFA models with the 
remaining scale items were repeatedly tested until we achieved an acceptable fit to our data 
with a 13-item scale of four factors (Appendix 1 Please see 
http://www.unibocconi.it/belle_ongaro_appendix1).  The Cronbach’s alpha for the 13-
item PSM scale was .81, and the coefficients for the four subscales ranged from .73 to .78. 
GFIs indicated a reasonably good fit (CFI=.92; TLI= .91; RMSEA=.06). The CFA showed 
convergent validity because all of the scale items were found to have statistically significant 
factor loadings (p < .01) for their respective latent constructs (lambda values ranged from .57 
to .79). The CFA also indicated discriminant validity because, on average, the proportion of 
shared variance between any two measures was low (= .12), and no measure shared more 
than 39 percent variance with any other measure. In our regression analyses we therefore 
used the 13-item version of the original Perry scale that is reported in Appendix 1. 
Control variables 
We controlled for factors that have been investigated as potential antecedents or 
consequences of PSM in previous research: sector of employment, field of employment, age, 
gender, region of birth, years of education, job tenure, number of subordinates, annual 
income, intrinsic motivation, and religiosity. Concerning operationalisation of the last two 
factors, we measured intrinsic motivation with a four-item scale adapted from Grant (2008). 
We asked respondents to indicate their agreement with the following four statements: “I am 
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motivated to do my job because I enjoy the work itself,” “My job is fun,” “I find my work 
engaging,” and “My job is also my hobby.” All items used 5-point Likert-type scales with 
anchors of 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly). Cronbach’s alpha was .91. We 
controlled for religiosity in light of literature showing that religiosity may be a relevant 
antecedent of PSM (Perry 1997, Perry et al. 2008). We measured religiosity with one item 
adapted from the Duke University Religion Index, “My religious beliefs are what really lie 
behind my whole approach to life.” This item used a 5-point Likert-type scale with anchors of 
1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly).  
 
Findings 
Italian public employees5 tend to self-report higher levels of public service motivation (PSM) 
relative to Italian workers in the private sector 
(http://www.unibocconi.it/belle_ongaro_table3) 
Similarly, self-reported levels of three of the four PSM dimension – i.e., commitment to the 
public interest (CPI), compassion (COM), and self-sacrifice (SS) – are on average higher for 
public employees relative to private sector workers. Instead, we did not find any public-
private difference with regard to the attraction to policy making (APM) dimension. This last 
finding is not surprising because APM is “a rational or self-interested motive that is less 
value or mission specific” (Wright, Moynihan, and Pandey, 2012, p. 210). Indeed, previous 
research has found a weak correlation between APM and a popular five-item version of 
Perry’s (1996) original scale (Alonso and Lewis 2001; Belle, 2013, 2014; Brewer and Selden 
2000; Kim 2005; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008; Wright and Pandey 2008; Wright, 
Moynihan, and Pandey 2012; Wright, Christensen, and Pandey forthcoming) has recently 
been validated as a multi-item unidimensional measure of public service motivation (Wright, 
Christensen, and Pandey forthcoming).  
The public-private difference in PSM holds true after controlling for economic sector of 
employment (i.e., primary, manufacturing or services), age, job tenure, gender, seniority, area 
of birth (i.e., northern, central or southern Italy), years of education, type of job contract (i.e., 
open-term, fixed-term or self-employed), annual income, intrinsic motivation, and religiosity. 
Table 4 reports the estimates from a series of ordinary least squares regressions that include 
these controls. We selected our regression model specification based on a goodness-of-fit 
analysis. In particular, both the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian 
                                                          
5 In the course of the analyses presented in this article we did not merge public and non-profit workers into a 
single category. Therefore, whenever we talk about public sector workers, these do not include respondents 
working for non-profit organizations. 
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information criterion (BIC) indicated that the model predicting PSM in Table 4 (Please see 
http://www.unibocconi.it/belle_ongaro_table4) 
is superior to any other – more restricted or less restricted – model specifications. Holding 
constant the other variables in the model, self-reported levels of PSM tend to be higher for 
individuals working in public and non-profit organizations compared to workers in the 
private for-profit sector, which are the reference category. Our data also suggest that self-
reported levels of PSM tend to be higher for respondents coming from central or southern 
Italy relative to workers from the northern regions of the country, for respondents with more 
education, for those who are not self-employed and for those reporting higher levels of 
intrinsic motivation or religiosity. 
Whilst in the private sector PSM levels do not appear to be related to job seniority, senior 
public managers tend to self-report stronger PSM relative to the rest of employees. The 
coefficient on the interaction between the dummy variable indicating that the respondent 
supervises more than twenty staff (senior) and the dummy variable indicating that the 
respondent works for a public organization (public) is in fact positive (beta=.12, p<.001). The 
opposite is true in the non-profit sector (beta=-.05, p<.001). We reached similar conclusions 
for three of the four PSM dimensions (i.e., APM, CPI, and SS).  The only exception is COM, 
which tends to be higher for senior managers relative to the rest of the staff also in the private 
for-profit sector, although the difference in PSM between senior management and the rest of 
the workers is smaller than in the public sector.  
 We then focused on public employees only, in order to explore possible motivational 
differences related to the job field. Table 5 (Please see 
http://www.unibocconi.it/belle_ongaro_table5) 
reports the estimates from regression analyses predicting PSM and each of its four 
dimensions among Italian public employees. Controlling for the other variables in the model, 
self-reported PSM tends to be the highest for those working in law enforcement6 and the 
lowest for healthcare practitioners. Educators (the reference category) and government 
employees lie somewhere in between. Other things being equal, self-reported PSM tends to 
be higher for public employees with longer job tenure, for senior managers, for public 
employees coming from central Italy, for respondents with more education, for those with an 
annual income between thirty and one hundred thousand Euros per year, as well as for 
individuals reporting higher levels of intrinsic motivation or religiosity.  
                                                          
6 The law enforcement category includes the police, the military, fire-fighters, judges and the like. The fact that 
these categories have not been contractualized makes particularly interesting the comparison of their levels of 
PSM relative to those of contractualized workers. 
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Discussion 
A first finding is the evidence about PSM being higher in the public sector than in the 
private/commercial sector in Italy. A first consideration we may draw from this is that, in 
comparative terms, Italy as of 2011 does represent a case in which the public sector is 
distinctive and cannot be equalled to the private sector in terms of the motivational structure 
of the people working in it.  
A second consideration is more theoretical rather than empirical and it is related to the first 
of the three propositions originally put forward by Perry and Wise (1990), who posited that 
“[The] greater an individual’s public service motivation, the more likely the individual will 
seek membership in a public organization” (p. 370). As of today, a number of studies have 
provided circumstantial evidence that PSM may be a factor in attracting and retaining public 
employees (Crewson, 1997; Lewis and Frank, 2002; Rainey, 1982; Vandenabeele, 2008). 
Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, we were only able to test for associations 
between PSM levels and sector of employment, while holding constant the other variables in 
our multivariate regression model. In other words, our correlational design was not suited for 
testing Perry and Wise (1990)’s proposition directly. Nevertheless, our data provide further 
international evidence that is coherent with the attraction-selection framework put forward by 
Perry and Wise, “namely that public sector workers do show greater PSM” (Steijn 2008, p. 
21).  
A third consideration is that, if our assumption that PSM was higher in the public sector 
also before the season of managerial reforms that began at the debut of the 1990s is true, 
NPM has not normalised the public sector, in terms of making the motives of public 
employees akin to those of their commercial sector counterparts. This is amenable to a 
variety of interpretations. It may be conjectured that NPM-inspired reforms do not have any 
normalising effect, thus leading to the outright rejection of the argument that its core 
doctrinal elements – making the government more business-like, and emphasising economic 
incentives as the lever to steer individual behaviour, conceived of as utility-maximising – 
should make the public sector more akin to the commercial sector. Alternatively, it may be 
conjectured that NPM reforms do have an effect, but this will show up only in the long term; 
two decades may be a short period for an institution like the public administrative system of a 
country that took centuries to acquire its current form (perhaps this manifests itself as a sort 
of ‘resilience’, the capacity of the public sector to ‘absorb’ a certain degree of NPM reforms 
without ultimately changing, or changing dramatically, its motivational structure), thus 
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preserving the argument but introducing in it a strong temporal dimension. The velocity of 
this normalisation process, in any case, would heavily depend on whether PSM is a stable 
trait or a dynamic one. If the former were the case, levels of PSM among a country’s public 
employees at any given time would be mainly due to attraction-selection-attrition 
mechanisms and any normalisation process would take longer. Instead, if PSM were a 
dynamic state similar to other PSM-related values (Cable and Parsons, 2001), the 
normalization could be quicker because current employees’ PSM could be modified through 
socialization and adaptation processes. Unfortunately, to date the lack of experimental work 
leaves the question unanswered of whether PSM is a stable trait or a dynamic state (Brewer, 
2003; Crewson, 1997; Houston, 2006; Posner and Schmidt, 1996; Rainey, 1982; Karl and 
Peat, 2004; Wright and Grant, 2010).  
Whatever the interpretations of the alleged impact of NPM reforms on public employees’ 
motivation, we should recall that a number of qualifications apply. First, we recall the 
assumption that we do not have any measure of the level of PSM before the last two decades 
of NPM-inspired reforms, hence we cannot control for trends. It might well be that reforms 
have substantively reduced the level of PSM in the Italian public sector, although not up to 
the point to have entirely depleted it. Second, Italy has undergone a relatively significant 
amount of NPM-inspired reforms, but not at the level nor the intensity of other countries (like 
Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom in certain periods), hence a counter-argument 
could be that NPM does have a normalising effect, but magnitude matters, and it is only 
because of the relatively limited accumulation of NPM interventions in Italy that 
normalisation is not apparent. This consideration leads to pondering over our second finding.  
The second element of evidence that emerged concerns the different degree of PSM that 
we found across policy sectors. Indeed, it appears that sectors characterised by a high 
concentration and intensity of imposition of NPM measures do have a significantly lower 
level of PSM than sectors that have been touched much more limitedly by such reforms - at 
least in one sector of doubtless importance this is the case: healthcare, when contrasted with 
sectors like education or law enforcement. To re-state, univocal attribution of causality 
cannot be demonstrated: we do not have measures of the level of PSM before the wave of 
NPM interventions, nor can we rule out other explanations, not least the one that PSM might 
have already been lower in the health sector, when contrasted to other job fields within the 
public sector, before the two decades of NPM reforms recounted. But the statistically 
significant difference in PSM between sectors that have undergone significant 
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transformations in structures and processes in line with NPM doctrines (like healthcare) and 
those which seem to have remained at the margin of the wave (like law enforcement) may 
add confidence to the thesis that interprets NPM has having a negative effect on PSM; 
‘negative’ both in the factual sense that it actually reduces the stock of PSM (depletion 
effect), and in the evaluative sense that theorisers of PSM usually associate higher PSM with 
potentially higher performance (Perry and Wise, 1990), hence it may be detrimental to public 
service organisations performance. This thesis, however, is here only put forward in the form 
of a tentative statement. It is amenable to future testing through replication across sectors and 
polities, and over time: a kind of research work that we advocate, for its potential 
contribution to both theory and practice, as discussed (in reverse order) in the remainder of 
this concluding section.  
Implications may be drawn for practitioners: starting from those pertaining to the specific 
intrinsic case about which this research provides empirical evidence, Italian would-be 
reformers do have to take into account that the public sector in their country is different in its 
motivational structure from the private/commercial sector. As a minimum for this reason, 
assuming that managerial recipes that have proved to work well in the private sector will 
produce equally positive results in the public sector is a flawed assumption. But what we 
have found is perhaps of more general significance: would-be reformers in other countries 
fond of NPM recipes will have to take care of a potential side effect that such reforms might 
engender: the depletion of PSM. This consideration requires qualifications; when talking of 
NPM-inspired reform a range of different and disparate provisions are lumped together: 
certain reform provisions are much more likely than others to produce such an effect, and 
ultimately it is research on the determinants of PSM that may underpin warranted statements 
about the impact of managerial reform on PSM. Such research would benefit, we would 
argue, from the systematic inclusion of measures of PSM in the analyses, diagnoses, and 
evaluations of public management reforms. 
Turning to the academic side of the use of the findings presented here, future research may 
benefit from these findings in a number of ways. First, scholars exploring the topic of the 
drivers of the motivation of public employees may use the Italian case of PSM to control for 
a set of factors in attempting to determine the drivers of PSM (Tables 4 and 5). Second, the 
stream of research in public management interested in the analysis of reform trajectories and 
explaining convergence vs. idiosyncrasies in public sector reform may consider including 
PSM both on the independent variable side and on the dependent variable side of the 
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equation. As an independent variable, PSM may be used to qualify the ‘context’ of a given 
country case, as a key component of the ‘cultural dimension’ that powerfully contributes to 
constituting the ‘institutional arrangements’ that differentiate and set each country on ‘its own 
path’ (thus offering a potential way forward for the investigation of the differentiated 
responses of individual countries to global pressures to reform). It may also help in case 
selection when comparative studies are conducted: similarity and dissimilarity between cases 
is usually gauged by considering historical-institutional dimensions (we thus have 
‘Napoleonic’ administrative systems, or Anglo-American ones, or post-soviet systems), 
almost always overlooking other profiles, like PSM. A reason why this has been the case is 
that only recently ‘large-scale’ surveys on PSM in different countries are on the way, and this 
article aims to contribute by providing evidence about the case of Italy. As a dependent 
variable, the accretion or depletion of PSM may well be included in the range of the effects of 
a public management reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011, chapter 5), thus providing another 
angle from which to look at the impact of managerial reforms.  
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